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More Steps Toward Fully Electronic
Interbank Check Collection and
Return: Amendments to Federal
Reserve Board Regulation CC and a
Regulatory Resolution of a Circuit
Split
Sarah Jane Hughes*
This article analyzes two actions in 2017 and 2018,
respectively, by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System that amend Regulation CC, which governs expedited
deposit availability and collection of checks generally and
implements the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987
and the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003. It
selects examples from the two sets of amendments that
highlight regulatory strategies being used by the Board to facilitate faster payments through the movement of electronic
images of checks or electronic information among banks in
the check-collection process. Those strategies involve creation
of new forms of instruments that can be treated as checks or
used to return checks to depositary banks, and, in the 2018
amendments, establishment of a presumption that reallocates risks in collection long a feature of Anglo-American
payments law, the doctrine of Price v. Neal. The strategies offer evidence of the surgical precision with which the Board
has acted over the past 30 years to modernize check collection
regulation with little use of its authority to preempt state
laws, primarily Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (“UCC”). This article does not describe or evaluate all
provisions of Regulation CC that the Board revised or added
in 2017 and 2018.
I. Introduction
On June 15, 2017, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board (“Board”) published ﬁnal amendments to
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Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. Part 229,1 (the “2017 Reg CC
Amendments”). The ﬁnal amendments focus on making deposit availability and check returns faster and on assigning
losses to the bank with the best opportunity to prevent it.
They contain incentives to encourage banks to make returns
of dishonored checks by electronic means,2 provide for feefree same-day settlements,3 and new warranties and indemnities for payments for which the orders were never in paper
form4 and for “remote deposit capture.”5 These amendments
represent giant steps towards fully electronic interbank
1

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Availability of
Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC), 82 Fed. Reg. 27552
(June 15, 2017).
Author’s Note: Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and
Fellow in Commercial Law at Indiana University’s Maurer School of Law.
She has taught payments law since 1989 and formerly, in her work at the
Federal Trade Commission, was involved in modest ways with the original
regulation implementing the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987,
which is the authority for some of the amendments described here. Professor Hughes has served more recently as the Reporter for the Uniform Law
Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (approved 2017, but not yet enacted in any state) and the Uniform Supplemental Commercial Law Act for the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency
Businesses Act (approved 2018), and formerly served as the ULC and
ALI’s Advisor on the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, and
implementing amendments to Regulation CC in 2004, which also is
discussed in this article.
As explained later in this article, Professor Hughes is indebted to
two Maurer School of Law colleagues, Executive Associate Dean Donna M.
Nagy and Professor Robert L. Fischman, for examples of the regulatory
exercise of authority to overrule or resolve splits of authority among
federal Circuit Courts of Appeal and otherwise. All opinions—any every
error—in this article Professor Hughes claims for herself.
Professor Hughes appreciates the invitation of Kristen David Adams, Interim Dean and Professor of Law at Stetson University’s School of
Law and outgoing chair of the UCC Committee of the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section, to offer this article to the Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal. Professor Hughes can be reached at
sjhughes@indiana.edu.
2

82 Fed. Reg. 27552, 27553.

3

82 Fed. Reg. at 27554 (to be codiﬁed at 12 C.F.R. § 229.36(f)) (feefreedom subject to conditions).
4

E.g., 82 Fed. Reg. at 27554–27555.

5

82 Fed. Reg. at 27555.

400 © 2019 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 48January 2019

STEPS TO FULLY ELECTRONIC INTERBANK CHECK COLLECTION
check collection and return and, one might say, they regularize trends in banking such as “remotely deposited checks”6
and will facilitate uses of “electronically created item[s].”7
The Board also re-used two of the plays from the playbook
ﬁrst seen when the Board implemented the Check Clearing
for the 21st Century Act8 14 years ago9—the creation by
regulation of new classiﬁcations of payments or payments
terminology and other regulatory actions that take further
steps to resolve what economists call “hold out problems.”10
In the context of interbank agreements to utilize electronic
presentments and the like, a holdout or small group of them
can frustrate a smoother-operating system. A regulation such
as Regulation CC or a federal statute such as Check 21 use
regulatory approaches to resolving holdout problems. Thus,
instead of collective action by groups of stakeholders, the
government—whether via legislation or regulation, or both,
takes over the role of collective action and frees up those
held up by the holdout to engage in transactions that the
government deems useful for a common purpose. In some
ways, the return to these two regulatory strategies make the
2017 and 2018 amendments to Regulation CC ﬁne examples
of surgical precision typical in my opinion of the Board’s
work in this arena since 1987.
The 2017 amendment also preserves room for variation by
6

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Amendments to
Regulation CC and J Addressing Remotely Created Checks, 70 Fed. Reg.
71218 (Mar. 16, 2006) (deﬁne the term “remotely created checks” and
creating transfer and presentment warranties for banks dealing with
them).
7

82 Fed. Reg. at 275579 (codiﬁed at 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(hhh)).

8

Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 (Oct. 28, 2003) (commonly
referred to as “Check 21”).
9

69 Fed. Reg. 47290 (Aug. 25, 2004) (codiﬁed at 12 C.F.R. Part 229,
Subpart D).
10

See “Supplemental Information — I. Statutory and Regulatory
Background,” 2017 Reg. CC Amendments, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27552. For an
excellent analysis of the “hold-out” problem generally, see Lloyd Cohen,
Holdouts and Free Riders, 20(2) J. Leg. Studies 351, 358 (1991) (deﬁning
holdouts as “bilateral monopolist engaged in negotiations on how to divide
up the pie”). In the context of interbank agreements to utilize electronic
presentments and the like, a holdout or small group of them can frustrate
a smoother-operating system.
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agreement of the banks involved,11 which U.C.C. § 4-103 allows, and for interbank agreements regarding electronic presentment, 12 which U.C.C. Sections 4-110 and 4-209(b)
require.
In the second group of amendments to Regulation CC, on
September 17, 2018, the Board’s action focused on rules applicable if there is a dispute between depositary and payor/
paying banks about the character of the check as altered or
forged.13
This article looks at the 2017 and 2018 new ﬁnal amendments to Regulation CC that implement the rules for
electronic items, remotely created checks. Part II evaluates
new deﬁnitions related to use of electronic images and
electronic information in the check-collection process. Part
III explains new rules extending Regulation CC’s Subpart C
to items not presented in paper form. Part IV looks at the
new provisions governing remotely created checks in 12
C.F.R. § 229.34(b). Part V reviews the new “Remote Deposit
Capture Indemnity in Section 229.34(f) that is similar to the
warranties for “remotely created checks” that are familiar to
many readers of the Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal.
Part VI presents views on the September 12, 2018 new
“alteration presumption” in 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(i). Lastly,
Part VII offers modest conclusions about the state of
electronic payments transactions subject to Regulation CC.
11

See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 229.30(b) (Writings); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27579.
12

See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 229.36(a) (Presentment and issuance of
checks—Receipt of electronic checks); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27583.
13

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Availability of
Funds and Collection of Checks, 83 Fed. Reg. 46849 (Sept. 17, 2018) (to be
codiﬁed at 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(i)) (hereinafter referred to as the “Alteration
Presumption” Rule). The proposed rule has been published on June 2,
2017, at 82 Fed. Reg. 25539.
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II. Deﬁning and Adding Rules Facilitating Uses of
Electronic Images and Information in the CheckCollection Process
In its 2017 amendments to Regulation CC (the “2017 Reg
CC Amendments”), 14 the Board promulgated numerous
changes and additions—one of the most important of which
is the new deﬁnitions of “electronic checks” and “electronic
returned checks”15 and of “electronically-created item”16 and
new rules regarding these three categories. The 2017 Reg
CC Amendments went into effect on July 1, 2018.17
The new “electronic check” and “electronic returned check”
deﬁnitions include
. . . an electronic image of, and electronic information derived
from, a paper check or paper returned check, respectively,
that — (1) Is sent to a receiving bank pursuant to an agreement between the sender and the receiving bank; and (2)
Conforms with ANS X9.100-187, unless the Board by rule or
order determines that a different standard applies or the parties otherwise agree.

These amendments establish a new class of “item” to which
Regulation CC will apply—the “electronically-created item.”18
This new term is deﬁned as “. . . an electronic image that
has all the attributes of an electronic check or electronic
returned check but was created electronically and not
derived from a paper check.” Additionally, as a new class of
“item”—a term deﬁned in U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9) 19 —an
“electronically-created item” may be a class of “item” to
which U.C.C. Article 4 will apply.
The 2017 Reg CC Amendments contain special provisions
respecting “electronically-created items.” Among these is a
new indemnity respecting electronically-created items in 12
14

2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27552.

15

2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27579 (§ 229.2(ggg)).

16

2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27579 (§ 229.2(hhh)).

17

2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27552.

18

U.C.C. § 4-102 (Applicability).

19

The term “item” means “an instrument or promise or order to pay
money handled by a bank for collection or payment. The term does not
include a payment order governed by Article 4A or a credit or debit card
slip.”
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C.F.R. § 229.34(g) and the extension of the 12 C.F.R.
§ 229.34(i) indemnity amounts to electronically-created
items. The new indemnity provides:
Each bank that transfers or presents an electronically-create
item and receives a settlement or other consideration for it
shall indemnify, as set forth in § 229.34(i), each transferee
bank, any subsequent collecting bank, the paying bank, and
any subsequent returning bank against losses that result from
the fact that(1) The electronic image or electronic information is not
derived from a paper check;
(2) The person on whose account the electronically-created
item is drawn did not authorize the issuance of the item
in the amount stated on the item or to the payee stated
on the item (for purposes of this paragraph (g)(2), “account” includes an account as deﬁned in section 229.2(a)
as well as a credit or other arrangement that allows a
person to draw checks that are payable by, through, or
at a bank; or
(3) A person receives a transfer, presentment, or return of,
or otherwise is charged for an electronically-created
item such that the person is asked to make a payment
on an item or check it has already paid.

The accompanying indemnity provisions for electronicallycreated items (and remote deposit capture under a new
indemnity in 12 C.F.R. § 229.34(f), discussed in the next section of this article) includes interest and the indemniﬁed
bank’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs of
representation.20 It also speciﬁcally preserves in connection
with a loss that “results in whole or in part from an indemniﬁed bank’s negligence or failure to act in good faith”21 and
“the rights of a person under the U.C.C. or other applicable
provision of state or federal law.”22 As a result, the 2017 Reg
CC Amendments provide a remedy for electronically-created
check that are similar to the new warranties provided for
remotely created checks in Section 229.34(b), which are
discussed later in this article. The 2017 Reg CC Amendments introduce indemnity provisions into Subpart C of
20

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(i)(1); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27582.

21

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(i)(2)(ii); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27582.

22

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(i)(2)(i); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27582.
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Regulation CC; prior to these June 2017 amendments,
indemnity provisions only existed in Subpart D of Regulation CC.23
III. Applying Regulation CC’s Subpart C to Presentments of Checks that Did Not Derive from Paper
Checks
The 2017 Reg CC Amendments bring new classes of instruments under Regulation CC’s scope in revised Section
229.30(a):
Checks under this subpart. Electronic checks and electronic
returned checks are subject to this subpart as if they were
checks or returned checks, except where “paper check” or
“paper returned check” is speciﬁed. For the purposes of this
subpart, the term “check” or “returned check” as used in
Subpart A includes “electronic check” or “electronic returned
check,” except where “paper check” or “paper returned check”
is speciﬁed.

As explained elsewhere in this article, the terms “electronic
check” and “electronic returned check” are newly deﬁned in
Regulation CC.24
IV. New Provisions on Remotely Created
Checks—229.34(b)
Continuing, the 2017 Reg CC Amendments added new
Transfer and Presentment Warranties with respect to
remotely created checks in Section 229.34(b). These warranties cover the amount and payee stated on the check25 mirror
the transfer and presentment warranties in the 2002 amendments to U.C.C. Sections 3-416(a)(6), 3-417(a)(4), 4-207(a)(6),
and 4-208(a)(4). Also, in addition to the new warranties, Section 229.34(b)(2) provides a warranting bank to defend by
proving that the customer involved is precluded under
U.C.C. Section 4-406 from “asserting against the paying
bank the unauthorized issuance of the check.” The 2002
amendments to the U.C.C. transfer and presentment war23

Compare 12 C.F.R. § 229.34 (2016) with the 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27581–27582.
24

See text accompanying note 15, supra; 12 C.F.R. 229.2(a)(ggg).

25

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(b)(1).
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ranties had not been widely enacted by the states.26 Final
amendments to Regulation CC, and Regulation J (for collections through Federal Reserve Banks)27 adopted provisions
related to remotely created checks but did not provide
comprehensive coverage of issues associated with them.
Thus, the 2017 Reg CC Amendments by adding new transfer
and presentment warranties expanded the Board’s rules
governing remotely created checks.
V. Addition of a New “Remote Deposit Capture”
Indemnity—12 C.F.R. § 229.34(f)
A new provision in the 2017 Reg CC Amendments created
an indemnity for “remote deposit capture.” 28 This new
indemnity is provided by any depositary bank that
. . . (i) Is a truncating bank under § 229.2(a)(eee)(2)
because it accepts deposit of an electronic image or other
electronic information related to an original check;
(ii) Does not receive the original check;
(iii) Receives settlement or other consideration for an
electronic check or substitute check related to the original
check; and
(iv) Does not receive a return of the check unpaid.29

The new indemnity contains two additional provisions. First,
26

See Ana R. Cavazos-Wright, An Examination of Remotely Created
Checks, 11 & notes 73–75 (undated), available at https://www.frbatlanta.o
rg/-/media/documents/rprf/rprf_resources/rprfwp0510.pdf (listing enacting
states as Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota,
Nebraska, new Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) [hereinafter “CavazosWright”]. For additional discussion of remotely created checks generally,
see id. at 3, 11. Despite the absence of a date from the electronic copy of
this research available to this author, it appears that this analysis was
prepared following the 2005 amendments to Regulation CC and the 2008
amendments to Federal Reserve Bank Operating Circular No. 3. Indeed,
the date on the URL appears to suggest publication in May 2010. For
more analysis of the 2005 and 2008 amendments to Regulation CC, see id.
at 3, 11.
27

12 C.F.R. Part 210.

28

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(f); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27582.

29

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(f)(1); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27582.
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the indemnity runs from the truncating bank30 to a depositary bank that incurs a loss if the loss is due to the check
“having already been paid.”31 In addition, the indemnity is
not available to a depositary bank that accepted an original
check that “bore a restrictive indorsement inconsistent with
the means of deposit.”32
In this new provision, the Board has ﬁlled the gap left
when only 14 states enacted the transfer and presentment
warranties that the 2002 amendments to U.C.C. Articles 3
and 4 provided. This is an example of the Board’s use of its
regulatory authority to ﬁll gaps in otherwise applicable statelaw coverage of emerging payments issues. The Board cited
as authority for all of the 2017 Reg CC Amendments authority granted it in both the EFAA and Check 21, as well as
“the ofﬁcial staff commentary to [Regulation CC].33 There is
no question that the EFAA34 and Check 2135 provide the
Board with ample authority for Regulation CC amendments,
such as the addition of the “remote deposit capture”
indemnity. The claim that prior staff commentaries also
provide authority seems like a stretch from an
administrative-law perspective.
VI. Establishment of a Presumption of “Alteration”
rather than of “Forgery” in Disputes among Banks
when the Original Paper Check Is Not Available
for Inspection, 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(i)
In the most recent changes to Regulation CC made, on
September 12, 2018, the Board announced its ﬁnal rule
amending Section 229.38 to include a special new liability
provision (“the Alteration Presumption Rule” for purposes of
30

12 C.F.R. § 229.2(eee) (deﬁnition of “truncating bank” added following Check 21 in the 2004 amendments to Regulation CC, 69 Fed. Reg.
47290, 47320 (Aug. 4, 2004)).
31

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(f)(2); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27582.

32

12 C.F.R. § 229.34(3); 2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27582.

33

2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27552 (summary of the ﬁnal rule)
(claiming authority under an agency’s own commentary explaining its
regulations is unusual).
34

12 U.S.C.A. §§ 4008, 1086(d).

35

12 U.S.C.A. § 5014.
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this article). The Alteration Presumption Rule will be effective on January 1, 2019,36 and will be applicable to disputes
as to whether a check was altered or was issued with an unauthorized signature and the original paper check is not
available for inspection by the parties at the time the dispute
arises.37 The Board opted to do as it had proposed to do: to
resolve this species of dispute between banks with a presumption that the check was altered.38 The Board cites as its
authority to promulgate this presumption the Congress grant
in the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 (the
“EFAA”).39
The Alteration Presumption Rule establishes a presumption that augments risk-allocation principles embedded in
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code since the early
1960’s—that depositary and collecting banks—and their
transferors—warrant to the payor bank that the draft presented for payment or acceptance and paid or accepted has
not been altered.40 In Article 4, transferors also warrant
along the collection chain until presentment and payment or
acceptance that the transferred draft has not been altered.41
The risk of paying a check that its customer did not authorize (a “forged check”) goes to the payor bank. Article 4’s
warranties run to the payor bank making payment from
persons, including banks, who present checks for payment or
acceptance that in fact the payor bank pays or accepts.42
U.C.C. Section 3-407(a) deﬁnes the term “alteration” as:
“Alteration” means (i) an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a
36

12 C.F.R. § 229.38(i).

37

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release,
Federal Reserve Board approves changes to liability provisions in Regulation CC, Sept. 12, 2018 3:00 pm, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newseven
ts/pressreleases/bcreg20180912a.htm.
38

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849, 46853.

39

12 U.S.C.A. § 4008, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 647 (rulemaking
authority and speciﬁc goals).
40

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849, 46853.

41

U.C.C. § 4-207.

42

U.C.C. § 4-208(a)(2) (“. . . the warrantor warrants that . . . the
draft has not been altered; . . .”).
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party, or (ii) an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or
other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the
obligation of a party.

The principle that assigned different risks to depositary
and payor/paying banks 43 is embedded deeply in AngloAmerican payments law. It owes its origin to the case of
Price v. Neal.44 That decision rested on the premise that the
drawee had superior knowledge over, and therefore better
ability, than an intermediary such as the depository bank to
judge the regularity and appearance of the drawer’s signature on the check.45 As noted by the Board’s Federal Register
notice of the Alteration Presumption Rule, depositary banks
know more about their customer’s deposit habits and account and they, in essence, “take responsibility for” the
checks they take for deposit.46 Thus, the Alteration Presumption Rule is consistent with the notion that depositary banks
are gatekeepers.
The term “forged checks” is not deﬁned in the U.C.C. The
term “unauthorized signature” is deﬁned in U.C.C. § 1-201
and discussed in U.C.C. § 3-403; both recognize unauthorized signatures as including forgeries and signatures made
without actual or apparent authority. The Board’s Commentary explaining the Alteration Presumption Rule cites both
aspects of the U.C.C.’s forgery rules.47
Risks of paying “forged checks” are normally assigned to
the drawee-payor bank and render the draft “not properly
payable” and, therefore, not properly chargeable against the
alleged drawer’s account under U.C.C. § 4-401. Checks bearing alterations, as U.C.C. § 3-407(a) deﬁnes them, and, in
the absence of negligence that contributed to the alteration,
may collected by payor banks and drawees or persons who
took for value, in good faith, and without notice of the altera43

U.C.C. § 4-105 (“payor bank” deﬁned); 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(z) (“paying
bank” deﬁned). Despite the different terms, the two deﬁnitions identify
the same bank in the check-collection process for purposes of this article.
44

97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762) (establishing the rule that the payor
bank bears the risk of loss in cases of “forged drafts”).
45

97 Eng. Rep. 871.

46

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849.

47

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46853.
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tion up to either the original, unaltered terms of the check
or in cases of incomplete checks altered by unauthorized
completion the terms as completed.48
Collection of checks has changed since the enactment of
the EFAA, the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act
(“Check 21”),49 and the Board’s own Regulation CC amendments implementing the former in 198850 and the latter in
2004. 51 The Federal Register notice for the Alteration
Presumption Rule explained that “the check collection
system has become virtually all-electronic, and the number
of instances in which the original paper check is available
for inspection in [disputes over altered versus forged checks]
will be quite low.”52 Additionally, in this check-collection
environment, the Board cited the fact that the original paper
check “is typically truncated by the depositary bank or a collecting bank before it reaches the paying bank.”53 These
technological changes have occurred since two 2006 United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals decided cases54 and the dif48

U.C.C. § 3-407(c).

49

Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 (Oct. 28, 2003).

50

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Availability of
Funds and Collection of Checks, 12 C.F.R. Part 229 (1988).
51

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Deposit Availability and Collection of Checks, 69 Fed. Reg. 47290 (Aug. 4, 2004) (codiﬁed at 12 C.F.R. Part 229). For a superb analysis of issues in check collection following the Check 21 Act, see Fred H. Miller and Linda J. Rusch,
“Request for Comments on Issues under U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 (March
16, 2009), available at http://uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Payment%20Is
sues_MillerRusch%20Memo_031609.pdf.
52

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849.

53

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849–46850.

54

Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 208 Fed. Appx.
232, 235, 61 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 458 (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished), available at https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/04-2569/
042569.u-2011-03-14.html (hereinafter “Chevy Chase Bank”); Wachovia
Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 60 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d 1126 (7th Cir. 2006) (hereinafter “Foster Bancshares”) (appeal from a
procedurally complicated district court decision effectively granting a
declaratory judgment to Wachovia). For additional discussion of these decisions, see Sarah Jane Hughes, Duty Issues in the Ever-Changing World
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fering outcomes in those cases prompted the Board’s Alteration Presumption Rule.55
In the ﬁrst of these Court of Appeals decisions, Chevy
Chase Bank, FSB, v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., the Fourth
Circuit afﬁrmed a grant of summary judgment to Chevy
Chase Bank (“Chevy Chase Bank”), the depositary bank, after Wachovia Bank had performed its duties under a “positive pay agreement” between Wachovia and its customer
based on the date, check number, and amount of the check.56
The alteration alleged by Wachovia and its customer was of
the payee’s name. When Wachovia sued Chevy Chase Bank
for breach of warranty, Chevy Chase argued that the original check had been altered to show a different payee, and
Wachovia argued that Chevy Chase had presented a forged
or counterfeit check using the same date, number, and
amount as the original check. 57 A factor in the Fourth
Circuit’s decision was that Wachovia also had destroyed the
original check after creating and storing a digital copy of it.58
Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that Wachovia was unable to
show that the check it paid had been altered,59 and had failed
to offer other persuasive evidence.60
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Wachovia
Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc. (“Foster Bancshares”),
an action for declaratory judgment brought by Wachovia,61
which was also the payor bank in this dispute. Wachovia,
following the same destruction-and-storing-digital-copies-ofpaid-checks practice described above, again could not prove
whether the check had been altered or was forged or
of Payments Processing: Is It Time for New Rules?, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
721 (2008).
55

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849.

56

Chevy Chase Bank, at 3.

57

Chevy Chase Bank, at 4, 6.

58

Chevy Chase Bank, at 4–5, 8.

59

Chevy Chase Bank, at 8.

60

Chevy Chase Bank, at 8.

61

Foster Bancshares, at 621.
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counterfeit.62 The Court of Appeals panel found in favor of
Wachovia again—this time as the payor bank because the
principle and outcome urged by Foster Bancshares that
would have prohibited the payor bank from enforcing the
Article 4 presentment warranty unless the payor bank had
retained the original paper check and that such a result
would impose additional storage costs on payor banks.63
The Seventh Circuit panel concluded that Foster
Bancshares had failed to offer evidence to support a favorable result for itself and a decision against Wachovia.64 As a
result, the Seventh Circuit afﬁrmed the district court’s decision placing the liability on the depositary bank, Foster
Bancshares,65 and set up the split of authority with the
Fourth Circuit favoring the depositary bank with its ﬁnding
that the payor bank had not proved that the check had been
altered, and the Seventh Circuit ﬁnding that the depositary
bank had not proved that the check was forged.
The Alteration Presumption Rule resolves this split—albeit
12 years after it ﬁrst occurred—in part based on the high
percentage of checks presented electronically and adopts a
presumption that, to the extent that the original paper check
is not available for inspection at the time of the dispute between banks, the check is an altered check, not a forged
check.66 This presumption places the risk squarely on depositary banks. The Rule also does not apply the presumption if
the original paper check becomes available for inspection by
the banks involved in the dispute.67
Additionally, Subsection 229.38(i)(2) explains that the
presumption
may be overcome by proving by a preponderance of evidence
that either the substitute check or electronic check does not
contain an alteration, or that the substitute check or electronic
62

Foster Bancshares, at 621.

63

Foster Bancshares, at 623.

64

Foster Bancshares, at 622–623.

65

Foster Bancshares, at 623.

66

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849–46850.

67

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46853 (§ 229.38(i)).
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check is derived from an original check that was issued with
an unauthorized signature of the drawer.68

Should it matter which bank or other person has destroyed
the original paper check? Looking back to the Chevy Chase
Bank and Foster Bancshares decisions, it is important to
note that the Seventh Circuit refused to establish a rule that
the payor bank could meet its burdens to show breach of the
“no-alteration” presentment warranty only if the payor bank
had retained the original paper check.69 These decisions,
thus, set up the need for a resolution of the burden of proof
needed in cases in which some bank in the collection chain
had destroyed the original paper check.
The Alteration Presumption Rule also allows banks in the
collection process to alter its effect by agreement70—a riskallocation tool that is present in most provisions of U.C.C.
Article 4.71 This tool is also used by the Board in the 2017
Reg CC Amendments.72 The broad allowance of variation by
agreement that the Board has deployed in its amendments
of Regulation CC’s Subpart C would not be as widely available under Subpart D because the Check 21 Act limits banks’
ability to vary its requirements to variations of “Section 8” of
the Check 21 Act.73
Finally, in the Alteration Presumption Rule, the Board did
not extend the new presumption to all disputes whether the
check in issue had been altered or forged. Rather, it limits
the reach of the Alteration Presumption Rule to disputes between banks74—as it happened this author had urged in a
68

Id. (§ 229.38(i)(2)).

69

Foster Bancshares, at 623.

70

Appendix E to Part 229—Commentary, cmt. I 229.38(i)(3) Presumption of Alteration (permitting variation by agreement “to the extent
permitted under § 229.37”); Alteration Presumption Rule, supra note 13,
at 46853.
71

U.C.C. § 4-103.

72

2017 Reg CC Amendments, at 27579.

73

12 U.S.C.A. § 5013.

74

12 C.F.R. § 229.38(i)(1); Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46853.

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 48January 2019

413

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 48 #4]
comment on the 2017 Alteration Presumption proposal.75 It
also does not apply to disputes between banks where the
“original check was transferred between [banks in the collection chain in the dispute], even if that check is subsequently
truncated and destroyed.”76
Several aspects of the Alteration Presumption Rule are
remarkable from an administrative-law perspective. First,
the Rule may be the ﬁrst exercise by the Board of authority
under the EFAA77 that has little to do with encouraging
faster deposit availability. Rather, it seems more supportive
of the realities of the check-collection eco-system in which
check-truncation prior to presentment for payment is the
norm.78
Second, the Alteration Presumption Rule also represents a
relatively rare case of a regulator using authority to resolve
a split among two Circuit Courts of Appeal. On the former
point, the Board admitted that the Rule is new.79 The Board
is not alone in using regulatory authority to resolve circuitcourt splits of authority, however. A quick consultation with
two Maurer School of Law faculty Donna M. Nagy and Robert L. Fischman since the September 17, 2018 publication of
the Alteration Presumption Rule produced numerous
examples of such uses by other agencies. For example,
Professor Nagy mentioned the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b5-280 and its shift away from the perceived
75

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Availability of
Funds and Collection of Checks, 82 Fed. Reg. 25539 (June 2, 2017)
(proposed rule would have reached “any dispute arising under Federal or
state law” regardless of the parties to the dispute).
76

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46851 (discussion of rule’s scope
and decision not to adjust application of the presumption based on which
bank destroyed the original check).
77

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46853.

78

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849–46850.

79

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46849 (“Regulation CC does not
currently address whether a check should be presumed to be altered or
forged in cases of doubt.).
80

Sec. and Exch. Comm., Duties of Trust or Conﬁdence in Misappropriation Trading Cases, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1065-2 (2016).
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narrowness outcome in United States v. Chestman81 in tippertippee insider trading prosecutions.82 More generally, Professor Fischman described agencies’ resolving splits as “common”83 and offered up three examples of agency action that
resolves or preempts a circuit-court split84 based on judicial
deference to their exercise of their regulatory authority
under Chevron.85
Professor Fischman sees the Alteration Presumption Rule
as different from the examples he gave because the rule does
not interpret the meaning of the text of a statute. Rather, he
observed:
[The EFAA] is just one that instructs an agency to “regulate
any aspect of the payment system in order to carry out the
general goal of prompt funds availability. Few agencies are
given the breadth of discretion that the Federal Reserve has
. . . Certainly, EPA generally does not have that kind of
delegation except in an imminent/emergency situation.86

Finally, the Alteration Presumption Rule technically does
81

U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 96259
(2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
82

See Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1315, 1357–1364 (2009).
83

Email from Robert L. Fischman to Sarah Jane Hughes, September
26, 2018 (on ﬁle with Sarah Jane Hughes) (hereinafter “Fischman Email”).
84

Id. In the ﬁrst, Professor Fischman cited a 2016 amendment by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of 50 C.F.R. § 402.2’s deﬁnition of “destruction of adverse modiﬁcation” in a manner that “satisﬁed those circuits
that took a stricter, more precise reading of the text of the Endangered
Species Act.” Fischman Email, supra note 83. The second example involved
the Environmental Protection Administration’s 2008 “Water Transfers
Rule,” [73 Fed. Reg. 33697 (June 13, 2008) (codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. § 122)] in
which the agency identiﬁed a circuit split as a reason to make an initial
rule on a subject. The third example follows the second in that the agency
and the Army Corps of Engineers used rulemaking in what Professor
Fischman described as a “preemptive effort to avoid circuit splits in
determining which wetlands constitute [“Waters of the United States”]
. . . subject to Clean Water Act regulations.” Fischman Email, supra note
83.
85

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 21 Env’t. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1049, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20507 (1984) (establishing a two-part test for
regulation’s interpretations of agencies’ organic authority).
86

Fischman Email, supra note 83.
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not preempt provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Rather, it is more in the nature of a
regulatory over-turning of an ancient court decision—in this
case, the doctrine originating from Price v. Neal, as previously noted in this article.87 In this respect, although the
Alteration Presumption Rule allocates the risk, it is an
example of surgical precision by the Board in using its EFAA
authority to facilitate faster funds availability by reducing
legal friction in the check-collection process.
It is too soon to predict how the Alteration Presumption
Rule may change behavior in the check-collection processes—
although the Board recites its sense that the rule favors
payor/paying banks.88 It also is unclear whether banks in the
collection chain will vary the presumption by agreement, as
the Alteration Presumption Rule permits.89 Similarly, we do
not know how the Alteration Presumption Rule will alter
disputes between banks and their customers or the banks’
willingness to permit truncation by their customers. These
questions must be left for another day.
VII. Conclusion
In its 2017 and 2018 amendments and additions to Regulation CC, the Board has laid foundations for enhanced uses of
payments technology through surgical uses of its organic
authority under the EFAA and Check 21. In so doing, it has
avoided using its preemption authority90 to preempt speciﬁc
provisions of U.C.C. Article 4 and has augmented the provisions of U.C.C. Article 4 and its own prior regulations
implementing the EFAA and Check 21 by ﬁlling gaps.
The Board, in addition, has exercised authority on issues
formerly governed by judicial precedent—resolving a split of
87

See text accompanying notes 9–10, supra.

88

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46851.

89

Alteration Presumption Rule, at 46853 (Appendix E to Part 229—
Commentary, cmt. I, 229.38(i).3 Presumption of Alteration). Readers
should notice that this Comment is exclusive to Section 229.38(i) and is
not embedded in the more general Regulation CC provision on variation
by agreement at 12 C.F.R. § 229.37.
90

12 U.S.C.A. § 4007(b) (EFAA’s grant of conﬂict preemption authority including over provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code enacted by
states); § 5012 (Check 21’s full conﬂict preemption grant).
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authority between the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits that had stood since 2006
and altering—for the second time—part of Anglo-American
payments law stemming from the 1762 decision in Price v.
Neal.91 The Board also continued to allow interbank variations by agreement of provisions of Regulation CC, which
U.C.C. § 4-103 also permits.
Finally, in the Alteration Presumption Rule, the Board did
not extend the new presumption to all disputes whether the
check in issue had been altered or forged. Rather, it limits
the reach of the Alteration Presumption Rule to disputes between banks and does not alter the presumption to work
against banks that destroyed original checks. Thus, the
Board has followed in own history since the EFAA of engaging in rulemaking in the area over which it has the longest
authority—the regulation of banks and the check-collection
processes used by banks.
91

The former alteration of the doctrine of Price v. Neal was achieved
by the 2002 Amendments to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4. For an excellent
discussion of those amendments and the doctrine, see Cavazos-Wright,
supra note 26, at 10–11 and notes 73–75.
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